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ABSTRACT 
This research concerns the formulation of models and 
methods for supply chains risk analysis. An ontological 
approach using the KOD method  (Knowledge Oriented 
Design) has been implemented to clearly identify 
relationships between the concepts of supply chain, risk, 
vulnerability and disturbances (critical scenarios). As a 
result, conceptual models of supply chains facing risk 
situations and critical scenarios are proposed. From the 
resulting conceptual models and mathematical models 
proposed in the literature, a multi-stage supply chain 
model using ARIMA models incorporating the 
randomness of the demand has been elaborated. In order 
to adapt this model to scenario criticality, constraints on 
orders and inventories have been taken into account. 
Under critical disturbances on information flows 
(demand) and physical flows (quality of the product 
supplied), constraints can be reached and supply chain 
behaviours can evolve toward critical dynamics or even 
become unstable. Supply chain vulnerabilities has been 
assessed and discussed. 
Keywords: Supply chain, Risk, Vulnerability, Cognitive 
Engineering, ARIMA, Simulation. 
1. INTRODUCTION
New technologies and globalization increase the 
complexity of supply chains and therefore expose them 
to risks of different types. Faced with uncertainty, 
supply chains appear more sensitive in the context of 
competitive pressure, unpredictable and volatile global 
market demand. In particular, supply chains are 
sensitive to local disturbances and uncertainties related 
to demand, supplies or information. Several studies 
have been conducted to analyze the topic of risk 
especially in the context of the supply chain. In general, 
risk is a combination of a probability of occurrence of 
an adverse event and a measure of the severity of the 
consequences of this event in terms of damage or injury 
(ISO / CEI73). The concept of risk is significant only in 
the presence of targets vulnerable to the effects of 
hazards induced by accidents. 
Due to the complex structures of today supply chains, a 
risk in a company may have consequences for other 
companies upstream or downstream. It thus threatens 
the entire chain. The resilient supply chain has the 
ability to adapt whatever the events to which the chain 
is subjected. Resilience is “the system’s ability to return 
to a new stable situation after an accidental event”. 
Taking into account that resilience is a 
multidimensional concept, Serhiy Y et al. define 
resilience of a supply chain as “the adaptive capability 
to prepare for unexpected events, respond to 
disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining 
continuity of operations at the desired level of 
connectedness and control over structure and function”. 
To preserve the resilience of supply chains, the areas of 
risk analysis and risk management are currently 
acquiring great interest, both from the theoretical and 
applicative standpoints. It is necessary to have 
indicators of vulnerabilities in the chain to determine 
the sensitivity of the chain to adverse events and to 
characterize the system's lack of resilience. 
This paper seeks to evaluate the vulnerability of supply 
chains. In agreements with the findings of (Gilbert 
2005), we propose to use a time series representation of 
the supply chain in the form of an ARIMA (Auto 
Regressive Integrated Moving Average) model that 
propagates along the supply chain and makes possible 
to represent the bullwhip effect. The limits of validity of 
this model correspond to hitting positivity and capacity 
constraints as the result of strong disturbances on 
product flows. It is then possible to simulate the 
constrained system evolution and compute some 
vulnerability indicators related to the frequency of 
constraints saturation. 
Due to a large amount of works in the areas of supply 
chain, risk, vulnerability and resilience, we were 
confronted with a large number of definitions that 
sometimes could be contradictory. In the first part of 
this paper, a conceptual analysis of supply chain and 
risk areas was carried out to clarify what might appear 
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to be ambiguities. In section 2, the problem of the 
disparity of terms and concepts is presented. In section 
3, the methodological approach, based on knowledge 
engineering, to address this problem is developed. In 
paragraphs 4 and 5, the ontological study is conducted 
to finally propose conceptual models linking the main 
concepts of the domains of supply chains and risks. In 
the second part of this paper, aspects of formal 
modeling and simulation are discussed. 
2. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The increased complexity of supply chains in recent 
years has naturally led to an increase in the number of 
potential points of weakness. By becoming more 
complex, they have become more vulnerable to the 
different disruptions they face (Chopra and Sodhi 
2004). In addition, (Haywood 2002) indicates that the 
lack of a common understanding of the term "supply 
chain" represents a significant barrier to identifying 
vulnerabilities and implementing appropriate risk 
management methods. 
The study of risk in supply chains was approached 
according to several fields of research. As suggested by 
(Zsidisin 2003), the term "risk" can be a source of 
confusion because it is perceived as a multidimensional 
concept. According to (Jüttner et al. 2003), this term can 
be used to designate internal or external uncertainties 
that reduce the predictability of the expected results. In 
this sense, "risk" refers to a source of risk and 
uncertainty, such as "political risks", "market risks" and 
"volatility of customer demand". According to the same 
author, the term can also be used to describe the 
consequences of these events. According to (Chopra 
2004), there is no consensus on the definition of supply 
chain risks, nor on the definition of supply chain risk 
management.  
If we focus on supply chain vulnerability, the literature 
shows that only a few studies have been done to date. 
Supply chain vulnerability is defined by (Juttner et al. 
2003) as the propensity of risk sources and risk drivers 
to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, thus causing 
adverse supply chain consequences. 
According to (Asbjørnslett 2009), the vulnerability of a 
supply chain is an intrinsic property. It represents the 
sensitivity of the chain to the effects of certain 
phenomena or disturbances. The concepts of 
consequence or damage have meaning only in relation 
to that of vulnerability. In other words, without 
vulnerability, there is no harm and therefore the risk is 
zero (Hennet et al. 2008, Hennet and Mercantini 2010). 
As a conclusion, the literature review concerning 
studies of supply chain vulnerabilities has shown a 
domain with a large number of ambiguities du to the 
large number of definitions: 
- ambiguities within supply chain definitions, 
- ambiguities within risk definitions, 
- ambiguities within definitions of supply chain 
risk management, 
- and ambiguities within  definitions of supply 
chain vulnerability, 
The notion of ontology and works currently developed 
by the scientific community of knowledge engineering 
can bring interesting answers to clarify these 
ambiguities. According to (Gruber 1993) and completed 
by (Borst 1997) et (Studer 1998), an ontology is a 
formal, explicit specification of a shared 
conceptualization. A conceptualization is an abstract, 
simplified view of the world that we wish to represent 
for some purpose, by means of concepts and their 
relationships. Ontologies structure a knowledge domain 
in highlighting concepts and semantic relations that are 
linking these concepts. 
As part of this study, we do not aim to build the 
ontology of the domain of supply chains. Our aim is to 
highlight the differences in the definitions proposed by 
the actors in the domain and whether these differences 
are based on genuine conceptual differences, or are they 
just the different complementary aspects of the same 
reality. Thus, our ontological analysis is in the spirit of 
the definition of (Gruber 1993), with the intention of 
arriving at a common conceptualization. At the end of 
this analysis, we will propose a conceptual model of 
supply chains through which we will position the rest of 
our work and in particular, we will justify the choice of 
the variables selected for the simulation models. 
3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
3.1. The methodological process 
The followed methodological process (Figure 1)
consists in adopting approaches and methods from 
Knowledge Engineering (KE) combined with formal 
modelling and simulation. 
KE methods are used in order to elaborate an 
ontological analysis of the domain as a basis for the 
development of conceptual models of supply chains, 
risks and vulnerabilities. The process is based on the 
"Knowledge Oriented Design” (KOD) method (Vogel 
1988; Mercantini 2007). KOD was designed to guide 
the knowledge engineer in its task of developing 
knowledge based systems. This method was designed to 
introduce an explicit model between the formulation of 
a problem in natural language and its representation in 
the chosen formal language. The inductive process of 
KOD is based on the analysis of a corpus of documents, 
speeches and comments from domain experts, in such a 
way to express an explicit cognitive model (also called 
conceptual model). 
From the resulting conceptual models, a multi-stage 
supply chain model using ARIMA (Auto Regressive 
Integrated Moving Average) models incorporating the 
randomness of the demand has been elaborated. Finally, 
supply chain vulnerability has been studied thank to the 
simulation of critical scenarios. 
3.2. The KOD method 
KOD is based on an inductive approach to explicitly 
express a cognitive model (or conceptual model) based 
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on a corpus of documents, comments and experts’ 
statements. The main features of this method are based 
on linguistics and anthropological principles. Its 
linguistics basis makes it well suited for the acquisition 
of knowledge expressed in natural language. Thus, it 
proposes a methodological framework to guide the 
collection of terms and to organize them based on a 
terminological analysis (linguistic capacity). Through 
its anthropological basis, KOD provides a 
methodological framework, facilitating the semantic 
analysis of the terminology used to produce a cognitive 
model (conceptualisation capacity). It guides the work 
of the knowledge engineer from the extraction of 
knowledge to the development of the conceptual model. 
The implementation of the KOD method is based on the 
development of three successive models: the practical 
models, the cognitive model and the software model 
(Table 1). Each of these models is developed according 
to the three paradigms: <Representation, Action, 
Interpretation / Intention>. 
The Representation paradigm gives the KOD method 
the ability to model the universe such as experts 
represent it. This universe is made of concrete or 
abstract objects in relation. The KOD method provides 
methodological tools to develop the structure of this 
universe of knowledge according to this paradigm. The 
Action paradigm gives the KOD method the ability to 
model the behaviour of active objects that activate 
procedures upon receipt of messages. The Interpretation 
/ Intention paradigm gives the KOD method the 
capability to model reasoning used by experts to 
interpret situations and elaborate action plans related to 
their intentions (reasoning capacity). 
The practical model is the representation of a speech or 
document expressed in the terms of the domain, by 
means of “taxemes” (static representation of objects – 
French word), “actemes” (dynamic representation of 
objects – French word) and inferences (base of the 
cognitive reasoning pattern). A “taxeme” is a minimum 
grammatical feature; it is the verbalisation of an object 
or a class of objects. An “acteme” is the verbalisation of 
an act or a transformation, a unit of behaviour. An 
inference is the act or process of deriving logical 
conclusions from premises known or assumed to be 
true. The cognitive model is constructed by abstracting 
the practical models. The cognitive model is composed 
of taxonomies, actinomies and reasoning patterns. The 
software model results from the formalization of a 
cognitive model expressed in a formal language 
independently of any programming language.
3.3 The ontology building process using KOD 
Research work in Ontology Engineering has put in 
evidence five main steps for building ontologies 
(Dahlgren 1995; Uschold 1996; Aussenac-Gilles 2000; 
Gandon 2002): 
1. Ontology Specification. The purpose of this
step is to provide a description of the problem
as well as the method to solve it. This step
allows one to describe the objectives, scope
and granularity size of the ontology to be
developped.
2. Corpus Definition. The purpose is to select
among the available information sources, those
that will allow the objectives of the study to be
attained.
3. Linguistic Study of the Corpus. It consists in a
terminological analysis of the corpus in order
to extract the candidate terms and their
relations. Linguistics is specially concerned to
the extent that available data for ontology
building are often expressed as linguistic
expressions. The characterization of the sense
of these linguistic expressions leads to
determine contextual meanings.
4. Conceptualization. Within this step, the
candidate terms and their relations resulting
from the linguistic study are analyzed. The
candidate terms are transformed into concepts
and their lexical relations are transformed in
semantic relations. The result of this step is a
conceptual model.
5. Formalization. The step consists in expressing
the conceptual model by means of a formal
language.
The projection of the KOD method on the general 
approach for developing ontology shows that KOD 
guides the corpus constitution and provides the tools to 
meet the operational steps 3 (linguistic study) and 4 
(conceptualization) (Table 2). The KOD method has 
been already implemented for diverse research projects 
(Mercantini 2003; Mercantini 2004; Mercantini 2007; 
Mercantini 20015) in the domains of road safety, safety 
of urban industrial sites and conduct errors of industrial 
plants. 
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Figure 1: The implemented methodological approach for the Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Study 
Table 1.  KOD, the three modelling levels. 
Paradigms 
Models 
Representation Action Interpretation 
Practical Taxeme: object static representation 
Acteme: dynamic 
representation of active 
objects 
Inferences 
Cognitive 
Taxonomy: object static 
organization according to 
theirs properties 
Actinomy: dynamic 
object organization Reasoning Pattern 
Software Classes Methods Rules 
Table 2.  Integration of the KOD method into the elaboration process of ontology. 
Elaboration process of 
Ontology 
KOD process Elaboration process of 
ontology with KOD 
1. Specification
2. Corpus definition
3. Linguistic study
4. Conceptualisation
5. Formalisation
1. Practical Model
2. Cognitive Model
3. Software Model
1. Specification
2. Corpus definition
3. Practical Model
4. Cognitive Model
5. Formalisation
6. Software Model
Supply Chain 
Definitions and 
comments (books, 
papers) 
Conceptual 
models 
Ontological 
analysis 
Corpus 
KOD 
ARIMA 
Conceptual 
models 
General and specific 
knowledge 
documents about 
risk, vulnerability and 
supply chain risks 
Ontological 
analysis 
KOD 
Formal 
Modelling 
Formal 
models 
Simulation 
Conceptual Analysis Formal modelling and simulation 
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4. ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY
CHAINS 
4.1. Ontology specification 
As discussed in paragraph 2, this work is not intended 
to develop an ontology but rather to understand 
disparities of views and definitions in the areas of 
supply chains and risks. In this sense, the ontological 
analysis will be conducted at a high level of abstraction 
and KOD will be implemented only for the 
representation paradigm. 
4.2. The corpus of the study 
The ontological analysis is based on a corpus of 
definitions (Table 3) supplemented by documents that 
specify the meaning of each of the terms in these 
definitions. These additional documents may come from 
the same authors or authors who have analyzed and 
discussed these same definitions. 
The advantage of considering a corpus of definitions is 
that they are, in essence, a conceptual vision of their 
authors. That is, they are already the ultimate outcome 
of a work of abstraction and reflection on the domain. 
On the other hand, this choice is consistent with the 
objectives of this analysis, which are to acquire a clear, 
global and precise vision of the field without wanting to 
build a detailed ontology. 
Given the large number of definitions, which emerge 
from the literature review, our choice was based on the 
following criteria: 
• the competent authority of the authors (and
thus of their definitions) within the scientific
community. Thus, we have retained the
definitions of the authors who are most often
referenced;
• the exclusion of the financial and economic
perspectives since they are outside our
disciplinary field of competence;
• the compliance with the classification criteria
of (Thierry and Bel 2001) which distinguish
the "firm" perspective from the "product"
perspective;
According to the "firm" perspective (definitions 6, 7 
and 8 from Table 3), the supply chain is progressively 
apprehended by focusing on each company and 
determining all the other companies connected to it 
(depending on the customer-supplier link) whatever the 
product to be produced. In this case, the supply chain 
may be limited to a customer and a supplier, or it may 
be expanded by the fact that suppliers of the supplier 
and customers of the customer can always be identified. 
According to the "product" perspective (definitions 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 from Table 3), the different actors in the 
supply chain and the different activities are identified by 
following a product from its initial state (often as raw 
material) to its final state (the finished product at 
customer). The chain is thus apprehended from end to 
end with respect to the product under consideration. 
Table 3: The corpus of definitions 
1. Lee et Billington (1993)
A supply chain is a network of facilities that performs the 
functions of procurement of material, transformation of 
material to intermediate and finished products, and 
distribution of finished products to customers. 
2. La Londe et al. (1994)
A supply chain is a set of firms that pass materials forward. 
Normally, several independent firms are involved in 
manufacturing a product and placing it in the hands of the 
end user in a supply chain (raw material and component 
producers, product assemblers, wholesalers, retailer 
merchants and transportation companies are all members of a 
supply chain). 
3. Ganeshan et Harrison, (1995)
A supply chain is a network of facilities and distribution 
options that performs the functions of procurement of 
materials, transformation of these materials into intermediate 
and finished products, and the distribution of these finished 
products to customers. 
4. Rota (1998)
A supply chain is the set of firms involved in the 
manufacturing, distribution and sales processes of the 
product, from the first supplier to the final customer.	  
5. Lummus et Vokurka (1999)
Supply chain can be stated as: all the activities involved in 
delivering a product from raw material through to the 
customer including sourcing raw materials and parts, 
manufacturing and assembly, warehousing and inventory 
tracking, order entry and order management, distribution 
across all channels, delivery to the customer, and the 
information systems necessary to monitor all of these 
activities.	  
6. Tsay et al. (1999)
A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of 
goods, information and funds. 
7. Stadler et al (2000)
A supply chain consists of two or more legally separated 
organizations, being linked by material, information and 
financial flows. These organizations may be firms producing 
parts, components and end products, logistic service 
providers and even the (ultimate) customer himself.
8. Mentzer et al., (2001)
A supply chain is defined as a set of three or more entities 
(organizations or individuals) directly involved in the 
upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and/or information from a source to a customer. 
9. Supply Chain Council (2004)
The supply chain is the continuation of the stages of 
production and distribution of a product from the suppliers of 
the suppliers of the producer to the customers of its 
customers.	  
4.3. Corpus analysis  
This step consists in extracting from each definition and 
complementary documents of the corpus, all the 
elements that are relevant to the representation of 
supply chain.  
Let us consider the (Lee and Billington 1993) definition 
(n°1, Table 3), supplemented by (Botta-Genoulaz 2005) 
and (Bouchriha 2002) comments which are: 
“Facilities can be storage units, production units, a 
whole set of storage and production units (factories), 
suppliers, distributors, customers, etc.” 
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Figure 2: a) A Supply chain is a kind-of Firm network - b) A Supply chain is-composed-of Firm(s) and Firm is-
composed-of Facilities – c) Raw material, Finished product, Component and Intermediate product are kind-of Product. 
Figure 3: The Firm concept taxonomy (kinf-of relation). (Product perspective). 
Figure 4: The Facilities concept taxonomy (kinf-of relation). (Product perspective). 
 
Figure 5: a) A Supply chain is-composed-of Firm(s) and Flow(s) – b) Service Product and Physical Product are kind-of 
Product. (Firm perspective). 
Figure 6: The Flow taxonomy (Firm perspective). 
a) b) 
Firm network 
Supply chain 
Supply chain 
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Facilities 
Product 
Raw material 
Component Finished product 
Intermediate product 
c) 
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Producer Distributor 
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Wholesaler Assembler 
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Storage unit Production unit 
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A qualitative analysis of risk, as defined within the 
“safety engineering domain” show that risk is a 
combination of (Figure 7): 
• the probability (likelihood) of something
(hazard or disturbance) happening,
• the intensity of hazard or disturbance,
• the vulnerability of stakes according to the
nature of hazards or disturbance.
And Damages are a combination of intensisty and 
vulnerability. By reducing the notion of combination to 
a multiplication, we can symbolically express the 
concept of Damage in the form of an equation: 
Vulnerability = Damages / Intensity 
Variations in the relationship are consistent with the 
idea of Vulnerability. Something (or stake) is all the 
more vulnerable that the damage it undergoes is 
important for a given intensity of the disturbance. 
Similarly, something (or stake) is all the more 
vulnerable that the damage it suffers is due to a low 
intensity of the disturbance. 
6. SUPPLY CHAINS MODELLING
6.1 Introduction 
In this section, the formal model used for this study is 
presented. It is assumed that a supply chain is a series of 
facilities that exchanges flow (Figures 2.b, 4 and 5). 
Our modeling unit is a production unit or entity with its 
stock upstream. It is considered that this entity is 
autonomous and therefore akin to an independent firm. 
Each entity will be referred to as the stage. 
A modular approach using ARIMA model (Box et 
Jenkins 1976) has been adapted to model supply chain 
dynamic and its flow exchanges (Figure 6). Each entity 
of the supply chain is modelled by its current stock 
quantity It (at the date t) and its order policy. From this 
order policy and from knowledge about the end 
customer demand Dt, orders Ot are set and the flow of 
information exchanged is given by Dt and Ot. Finally, 
from an order issued at a date t-L, a physical product 
flow  (Rt) is received at the date t. The delivery lead 
time L is supposed fixed and known (L = do + dp + dd 
(Table 5)). 
Table 5: Conceptual interpretation of ARIMA variables 
In the following we present the modelling of a supply 
chain using ARIMA model. The class of ARIMA 
models is the most used representation of a time series. 
It is a combination of an autoregressive process (AR), 
an integrated process (I) and moving averages (MA) 
(Box and Jenkins 1976). When this process is stationary 
we talk about ARMA model. ARIMA models are built 
to represent the behavior of processes subject to random 
shocks over time. Random shocks represent random 
events (strikes, stock market crash, etc.), also known as 
disruptions, which affect the temporal behavior of these 
processes. Moreover the main purpose of this model is 
to predict the future values of the random process, 
taking into account its previous values observed. 
6.2 The ARIMA supply chain model 
Assuming that the demand is random and uncertain, in 
the form of an ARIMA (p, d, q) process (equation 1), 
and that the quantity of the products received at the date 
t is equal to the quantity of the products ordered at a 
date t-L (Rt = Ot-L), in (Graves 1999; Vuttichai 2004; 
Gilbert 2005; Gilbert et Vuttichai 2006; Hennet et 
Mercantini 2010; Sakli et al. (2014)) supply chain 
modeling is about formulating the demand Dt, the level 
of stock of It (equation 2) the quantity of products or 
components to be ordered Ot taking into account 
forecast demand Dt+L. 
Moreover, from this presentation, and under « order up 
to policy » (Gilbert 2005) proved that the stock and 
order are also ARMA and discussed the causes of the 
bullwhip effect, a phenomenon in which variation in 
demand produces larger variations in upstream orders 
and inventory. This gives the dynamic of one stage of 
the supply chain. 
A mathematical formulation of the demand Dt can be 
constructed by the method of (Box and Jenkins 1976), 
where φi and θi are two identification parameters (Box 
et al. 2011) and εt is a white noise. 𝐷! = µμ + 𝜙!(𝐷!!! − µμ)!!!! + 𝜀! − 𝜃!𝜀!!!!!!!       (1)    
Under « order up to policy », the inventory balance 
equation is written : 𝐼! = 𝐼!!! + 𝑂!!! − 𝐷! (2) 
The quantity to be ordered represents the difference 
between the inventory level S and the position of the 
current inventory. 𝑂! = 𝑆 − 𝐼! + 𝐷! 1 +⋯+ 𝐷! 𝐿 −   𝑂!!! −⋯−   𝑂!!!!!    (3) 
where 𝐷! 1 +⋯+ 𝐷! 𝐿  the previson of the demand 
in period t for the next t+1, … , t+L periods. 
To find the model of the whole chain, we iterate this 
model by assuming that the demand Dt in an upstream 
stage is the order passed by the downstream stage Ot. 
This basic model can be used to model a multi-stage 
supply chain, put in series. The approach is to assume 
that the demand for an upstream stage is equal to the 
order quantity of the downstream stage.  
ARIMA%
variables
Current%Customer%
Demand Dt
Customer%Demand%
Average µ
Quantity Ot
Preparing%Delay do
Physical%
Product%Flow Quantity Rt
Service%
Product%Flow Not%modelled
Financial%Flow Not%modelled
Current%Stock%Level It
Replenishment%
Threshold S
Product%Unit Production%Delay dp
Distribution%Unit Distribution%Delay dd
Conceptual%Entities%(concepts%and%attributes)
Storage%Unit
Demand%Flow
Order%Flow
Informational%
Flow
FLOW
FIRM
Product%Flow
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6.3 A constrained ARIMA supply chain model 
The stationary behavior of an ARIMA model used for 
the representation of a supply chain is valid when the 
constraints of the companies forming the supply chain 
are respected. 
In real cases, the company has a limited inventory 
capacity (𝐼) and cannot order more than a maximal 
amount of products from the supplier (𝑂). Also, the 
level of the stock and the quantity delivered cannot have 
negative values. To take these constraints into account, 
(Sakli et al. 2015) present a constrained ARMA model, 
in which the dynamic equations (2), (3) are respectively 
replaced by the following non-linear equations. 𝐼! = min  (𝐼!!!+𝑂!!!−𝐷!  , 𝐼)𝐼! = max  (𝐼!!!+𝑂!!!−𝐷!  ,0)                         (4)𝑂! = min(𝑆 − 𝐼! + 𝐷! 1 +⋯+𝐷! 𝐿 −   𝑂!!! −⋯−   𝑂!!!!!    ,𝑂  )𝑂! = max        (𝑆 − 𝐼! + 𝐷! 1 +⋯+𝐷! 𝐿 −   𝑂!!! −⋯−   𝑂!!!!!    , 0  )  (5)  
6.4 Vulnerabilities indicators 
The study of the vulnerability of the system facing an 
undesirable event is necessary when the supply chain is 
deviated with respect to its objectives (reliability, 
responsiveness, etc). 
It is extremely important to follow stock movements in 
order to avoid to have too much stock (immobilized 
money, risk of obsolescence of the articles which leads 
to a loss of money) or to be in stock-outs situation (loss 
of turnover, very bad for the brand image). 
Vulnerabilies indicators can be calculated by evaluating 
the damage of the disturbance and its intensity (Hennet 
et Mercantini 2010): an Inventory cost indicator 
(ICostInd), a total Cost indicator for the stage (CostInd), 
an indicator of excess products (Lind) and a Supply 
limit indicator (SInd). 
7. SIMULATION
The purpose of this simulation is the implementation of 
the indicators facing the disruption of demand. To do 
this we assume that the D demand is 
	  𝐷! = 0.5  𝐷!!! + 0.5  𝐷!!! + 𝜀!  𝜀!  is a Gaussian white noise of zero mean and standard 
deviation σ2=5. The dynamic of the demand and its 
prediction are shown in the figure 8. 
Figure 8: dynamic of the demand and its prediction 
To illustrate the effect of the demand disruption, we 
take this example again. The same average demand is 
maintained and its Standard deviation is modified to 
obtain the three scenarios of the table 5. 
Table 6: the three scenarios of the demand. 
Scenario Demand Standard deviation 
1 D1 10 
2 D2 7,5 
3 D3 5 
With the values: S=45, L=3, 𝐼=45, et  𝑂 =55  
To compare the behavior of these three demands 
through the proposed indicators, the following table 
groups together the different results obtained, assuming 
that the sliding observation window d = 500. 
Table 7: simulation results. 
Scenario ICostInd CostInd Lind SInd 
1 
2 
3 
0.0805 
0.0199 
0.0120 
0.2140 
0.1204 
0.1063 
0.1177 
0.0540 
0.0240 
0.3939 
0.3531 
0.2109 
From this table we can deduce that the more the demand 
is fluctuating, the more the system arrives at states of 
imbalance and therefore becomes vulnerable to adverse 
events. The interest of these indicators is to evaluate the 
disturbances resulting from the expected objectives in 
terms of performances. Periodic observations of these 
indicators can highlight changes in existing imbalances 
and also reveal potential imbalances monitoring and 
detection of drift that require risk-related decisions.  
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the process employed in obtaining 
conceptual models of supply chains facing risk 
situations. The process is based on the analysis of 
academic and return on experience documents 
according to the knowledge acquisition method KOD. 
The resulting conceptual model has been used to build a 
multi-stage supply chain model based on ARIMA (Auto 
Regressive Integrated Moving Average) models 
incorporating the demand randomness. Finally, supply 
chain vulnerability has been studied thank to the 
simulation of critical scenarios. The results characterize 
the effect of demand variability on stock level and order 
quantity on the upstream stage.  
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